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This paper examines the impact of globalization on two transitional economies in Asia.
Both countries have undergone a radical economic reform process over the past decade,
assisted by increases in external trade flows, foreign investment activity, and external
assistance. However, the pace of economic reform has decelerated since the perceived
perils of globalization—as evidenced by the Asian Crisis—have become more apparent
to the leaderships of these two avowedly socialist states. Although neighbouring and
fraternal countries, adopting broadly parallel economic liberalisation programmes, the
forces of globalization have manifested themselves in different ways in Laos and
Vietnam. The paper discerns these differences, and assesses whether the two countries
are likely to overcome the current hiatus in their economic reform programmes.
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Introduction
Your country belongs to the Western seas, ours to the seas of the East.
Just as the horse and the buffalo differ between themselves, so do we
differ by our language, our writings and our customs. … Everywhere
man has the same value, but his nature is not the same.1
It could be argued that few Asian countries are more aware of the potency of global
forces, and the impact of external trends, than Laos and Vietnam. At first glance such an
assertion may appear strange, particularly for two economies that were wholly closed to
all foreign business before the late 1980s. Indeed, these two countries are regarded by
many as insular, led as they are by avowedly communist parties that remain ambivalent
towards the economic development orthodoxy held by most nations in East Asia.2 But
with the exception of highly externally-oriented economies like Singapore and Hong
Kong (both of which have tended to embrace globalization), it is hard to identify other
countries in Asia that have been more exposed to external economic and political forces
this century than Laos and Vietnam. Both Laos and Vietnam were French colonies, and
while the former was a ‘colonial backwater’, the latter was on the receiving end of
substantial French capital inflows during the first three decades of the twentieth
century.3 Although neglected by French capital, the current Lao state was created by the
French administration, at least in terms of its current borders and territorial extent,
having previously constituted three petty kingdoms, outlying parts of which were
subsequently absorbed by neighbouring countries.4 The liberation struggle to eject the
French from both Laos and Vietnam mutated and inflated into a conflict that became the
primary cockpit of Cold War superpower rivalry throughout much of the 1960s and
early 1970s. After the end of hostilities in 1975, both Laos and Vietnam had relatively
brief flirtations with inward-oriented command economics, payrolled in large part by
the Soviet Union. But since the late-1980s, both countries have sought—at least
partially—to open their economies to foreign trade and capital inflows, propitiously
timed to coincide with a global trend of rising investment and trading activity in
emerging markets. And finally, as a result of substantial outflows of refugees during
recent decades (particularly in the latter part of the 1970s), quite large Lao and
1 Taken from an 1862 declaration, by the inhabitants of Go-Cong province in southern Vietnam, to the
French, “warning the invaders that they would fight to the death for the return of the territory ceded
the previous year”. See Smith (1968), p. 183.
2 This orthodoxy might be summed up as broadly entailing economic liberalisation (including
divestment of state firms, restructuring domestic corporates, encouraging the private sector to
burgeon, allowing foreign corporates to enter, etc.), the fruits of which will subsequently be evidenced
in improved economic growth. Evans has depicted Laos as being a ‘post-socialist’ regime, arguing
that the term ‘socialism’ in Laos “no longer represents an economic program … Instead, it is a device
of political rhetoric which proclaims … that the one-party state has no intention of allowing liberal-
democratic reforms.” Evans (1998), pp. 1-2. The same pertains to Vietnam.
3 See Callis (1942), p. 77. France invested as much as 8 billion francs in colonial Indochina, prior to the
Second World War. Callis (1942), pp. 79-80.
4 Agreement by France and Siam to delineate much of the border along the Mekong River meant that a
larger number of Lao found themselves living outside Laos than those left within its borders. See
Stuart-Fox (1997).2
Vietnamese communities now reside overseas, most notably in Australia, France and
the US.5
The above notwithstanding, the leaderships in Laos and Vietnam are clearly not
comfortable with the current forces of globalization, perceiving them to be—at best—a
rather mixed blessing. While foreign capital inflows and other economic inputs are
undoubtedly welcome, much of the additional socio-political ‘baggage’ is less well
received. Vietnam's leadership frequently warns its people to be on the guard for
‘peaceful evolution’; a process by which external forces will seek to covertly undermine
the regime. It is implied that having failed to defeat Vietnam by overt and military
methods, enemies are using more subtle means in a bid to achieve the same end. Given
Vietnam's long history of resisting external aggressors, it is perhaps not surprising that
Hanoi continues to be vigilant against hegemonic intent. The Lao government too has
intimated its desire not to see the country overwhelmed by foreign interests, although
seems quite willing to have Vietnam as its principal mentor.6
The leaderships in Vientiane and Hanoi tend to depict their concerns about globalization
as primarily pertaining to its impact on issues like local traditions, national culture, and
so on. However, the potential impact of globalization in diluting national sovereignty
and contracting the authority of government are probably of even greater (and much
more immediate) concern to Vientiane and Hanoi, although rarely expressed as such7
The leaderships are also not helped by adhering to an ideology—now largely abandoned
in the economic sphere, but still espoused in the political realm—that does little to equip
them with the tools needed to comprehend recent changes in international business
patterns, let alone notions of the ‘new economic paradigm’. Instead, it allies them with a
diminishing community of socialist states that have yet to deliver a convincing strategy
to deal with the forces of globalization. The leaderships in Vientiane and Hanoi are
certainly not ignorant of globalization, but seem unsure how to respond, and—as
discussed below—seem more focused on the perceived perils of globalization.
5 Overseas Lao and Vietnamese communities remit considerable savings back to relatives still living in
the country, providing a useful fillip to both countries' current accounts.
6 It should be noted that not all Lao share the government's view of Vietnam as mentor and ally. As
Evans points out, the Lao leadership “would not have come to power in 1975 without the long-term
assistance of North Vietnam's own ‘secret army’ … in the closing stages of the war.” Evans
(1998), p. 3.
7 Such notions of weakening sovereign powers, stemming in part from forces of globalization, are by no
means invalid. The World Bank recognises that “nation states are facing increasing limitations as
territorial constructs”. Rischard (2000), p. 3.3
1 A brief economic profile of Laos and Vietnam
Sharing a common border, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam are states with some strong similarities, albeit with a few marked
differences. Both are less developed countries, with average per capita GDP figures that
are below US$350 per annum.8 Both regimes were established in 1975, after years of
military conflict, and have since been led by communist parties (the Lao People's
Revolutionary Party and Vietnam Communist Party). Although political pluralism is not
entertained, both countries have been enacting economic liberalisation programmes
since the implosion of the socialist bloc in the late 1980s. Rather like China, they have
sought to reform the economy, but not the political sphere. In Laos, this programme of
economic reform is known as the ‘new economic mechanism’, and in Vietnam it is
referred to as ‘doi moi’. Relations between Vientiane and Hanoi are fraternal, and the
leaderships regard each other as close allies. Laos is a landlocked country, with a
population of around five million, while Vietnam has a lengthy coastline, and has a
populace of about 80 million. Laos's total land area is roughly 70 per cent that of
Vietnam, resulting in a stark difference of population densities between the two
countries. The ethnic profile of Laos's population is extremely diverse, whereas
Vietnam's citizenry is relatively uniform in this regard.
By global standards, the economies of Laos and Vietnam are relatively small. The GDP
of Laos is a mere US$1.4 billion, while Vietnam's is around US$25 billion. In Laos, the
agricultural sector employs the majority of people and accounts for about half of total
GDP, with the service and industry sectors representing about a quarter of aggregate
GDP each. In Vietnam, the agricultural sector also employs the majority of people
(about 80 per cent of the labour force), but only accounts for about a quarter of total
GDP, with the industry and service sectors representing 34 per cent and 42 per cent of
total GDP respectively. Prior to 1987, both countries operated centrally-planned
economies, supported by not inconsiderable socialist bloc assistance, primarily sourced
from the Soviet Union. Economic interaction with the West was minimal, with Laos in
particular becoming relatively closed. Although some of the more extreme elements of
central planning—such as obligatory collectivisation of agriculture and a complete ban
on private sector endeavour—were phased out at the end of the 1970s, the economic
performance of both countries remained extremely lacklustre, until the advent of
economic liberalisation measures in the mid-1980s. These economic reforms succeeded
in overcoming some of the efficiencies of the old system, thereby unleashing a
commendable spurt of growth, as measured across a wide range of macro-economic
indicators.
8 Laos has a nominal per capita GNP of US$258, and Vietnam has a nominal per capita GNP of
US$310, according to Asiaweek (24 March 2000), p. 65. The UNDP's most recent human
development index, ranks Vietnam 122nd and Laos 136th in its ranking of 174 countries. See UNDP
(1998), pp. 130-132.4
Table 1:
Laos and Vietnam's Macro-Economic Profiles Compared
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998E
Real GDP growth (%)
Laos 8.1 7.0 6.8 6.9 4.0
Vietnam 8.8 9.5 9.3 8.2 5.8
Agriculture sector as % of GDP
Laos 57.5 55.6 53.3 53.3 52.6
Vietnam 27.4 27.2 27.8 25.8 26.0
Industry sector as % of GDP
Laos 18.1 19.2 21.1 21.2 21.9
Vietnam 28.9 28.8 29.7 32.1 32.7
Services sector as % of GDP
Laos 24.4 25.5 25.6 25.5 25.5
Vietnam 43.7 44.1 42.5 42.2 41.3
Consumer price index (%)
Laos 6.8 22.6 13 19.3 90.1
Vietnam 14.4 12.7 4.5 3.6 9.2
Exports (% of GDP)
Laos 19.5 17.5 17.4 18.3 26.7
Vietnam 26.2 26.2 31.6 38.4 40.3
Imports (% of GDP)
Laos 36.6 32.9 37.3 37.3 43.8
Vietnam 33.9 37.1 45.2 47.7 50.9
Balance of payments on current account (% of GDP)
Laos -14.3 -13.2 -16.1 -16.1 -10.4
Vietnam -8 -11 -10.3 -6.8 -4.1
Foreign investment approvals (number of projects)
Laos 130 55 63 66 68
Vietnam 367 408 370 313 -
Foreign investment approvals (value US$m)
Laos 2,598 615 1,293 142 123
Vietnam 3,664 6,722 7,702 4,456 1,7385
External debt outstanding (US$m)
Laos 1,971 2,068 2,175 2,323 -
Vietnam 6,670 7,756 9,657 11,612 14,861
Debt service ratio (% of exports)
Laos 3.3 5.7 5.9 9.5 11.9
Vietnam 13.4 12.2 11 11.4 13.4
Exchange rate against US$1
Laos (kip) 730 940 975 2,205 4,750
Vietnam (dong) 10,978 11,037 11,032 11,683 13,297
Sources: Asian Development Outlook 1999 (ADB); Various IMF Staff Country Reports;
ING Barings.
2 Convergence of economic liberalisation and globalization, prior to the ‘Asian
crisis’
If one plots growing globalization by rising levels of external trade (as a percentage of
GDP) or foreign investment inflows (as a proportion of domestic investment), it is clear
that both Laos and Vietnam have become much more ‘globalized’ since the
commencement of economic reforms in the late 1980s. Key pillars in the economic
liberalisation programmes in both Laos and Vietnam were the opening up of the
economy to foreign investment (to attract much-needed capital and business know-how)
and the successful bid to increase external trade (to generate foreign exchange)9.F o r
example, Vietnam's export earnings grew from less than US$500m in 1988 to slightly
under US$9 billion in 1997; rising from less than 3 per cent of GDP to almost 38 per
cent of GDP. Similarly, foreign investment pledges increased from less than US$400m
in 1988 to over US$8.6 billion in 1996; rising from roughly 10 per cent of domestic
investment to roughly 30 per cent greater than total domestic investment.10 Laos's
performance in external trade and FDI inflows has not been as impressive as Vietnam's,
but showed broadly the same underlying trend during the first half of the 1990s.
The timing of the ‘opening up’ of the Lao and Vietnamese economies to foreign capital
inflows and external trade was propitious, coinciding with an unprecedented rally in
investment and trade flows across global emerging markets in general, and Asia in
9 To be precise, external trade volumes were not only increased, but also re-oriented, from trading with
the socialist bloc countries to mostly Asian and European countries. Vietnam in particular did a
remarkable job in re-orienting its external trade swiftly, and with little apparent dislocation.
10 One should note that the figures pertain to FDI inflow pledges, and not FDI disbursements.6
particular.11 The forces of globalization were regarded as being relatively benign at this
time, with integration into the global economy deemed necessary to revive their ailing
domestic economies.12 While elements of the Lao and Vietnamese leaderships may
have harboured reservations about this diversion in the socialist development path, these
were subsumed by a more pressing need to re-invigorate their moribund and
malfunctioning economies, at a time when the primary external sponsor (the Soviet
Union) was unable to continue with its assistance.
The response of foreign venture capitalists to the ‘opening up’ of Laos and Vietnam was
very favourable, discerning that some of East Asia's last frontiers were now being made
accessible. The fact that Laos and Vietnam were located in a part of the world where so
many other economic success stories were already apparent helped matters
tremendously. For investors and traders seeking to penetrate new domestic consumer
markets, Vietnam in particular offered the potential of over 70 million new customers.
For investors seeking to find new low-cost labour platforms for producing manufactured
goods, here were two countries where semi-skilled labour cost less than US$50 per
month.
The role played by foreign investment—with its the value-added inputs of new
technology, management know-how, access to foreign markets, and so on—in the
economic liberalisation programmes of Laos and Vietnam should not be under-
estimated. It is undoubtedly the case that Vietnam's ‘doi moi’ programme would have
been far less successful without the inflow of substantial foreign investment between
1988 and 1996. Indeed, FDI was a critical motor of economic growth and development
in both Laos and Vietnam, during their first decade of economic liberalisation. To some
extent at least, this trend mirrored a similar process—roughly sixty years before—with
the inflow of French colonial capital in the 1920s playing a pivotal role in advancing the
Vietnamese economy.13 More than one author has noted that French capitalists were
responsible for taking Vietnam on the “next step along the road of economic change”
during the early part of the twentieth century.14 A similar role could be played by FDI
in the 1990s, assisting Vietnam in taking its economy to a new level of production, by
supporting the creation of an export-oriented manufacturing and processing base.
The 1990s wave of foreign investment did not seek to emulate the colonial notion of
mise en value that was associated with French capitalist penetration of Laos and
Vietnam in the early twentieth century. But another parallel between the foreign
investment activity of the 1980-90s and the early twentieth century is perhaps worthy of
11 South and East Asia recorded average aggregate FDI inflows of roughly US$18.6bn in the period
between 1987 and 1992, but this figure steadily increased each year, to almost US$88bn in 1997.
UNCTAD (1999), p. 479.
12 Globalization is commonly perceived to be a product of easier and more rapid flows of capital and
technology across the world, resulting in the increased interdependence of national economies, and
growing emphasis of transnational firms' cross-border production networks. In the words of
Singapore's deputy prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, globalization “does impose market discipline on
the participants, which can be harsh, but is the mechanism that drives progress and prosperity”.
Quoted in Olds et. al (1999), p. 1.
13 For a good overview of French capital in colonial Indochina, see Callis (1942), pp. 71-87.
14 For example, see Smith (1968), p. 128.7
note. More than any other colonial regime in Southeast Asia, France enacted various
measures that virtually excluded all non-French foreign investors. As a result, one
observer estimates that just 3 per cent of all investment in Indochina came from
countries other than France.15 Although no foreign power sought to dominate FDI
activity in Laos or Vietnam in the 1990s, the former did encounter levels of Thai
investment that far exceeded all others. But, more interestingly, in a sort of reversal of
French colonial policy, the US maintained an investment embargo against Vietnam,
until 1995.16 This allowed European and several East Asian firms to steal a march on
their US competitors in Vietnam, and added to the allure of this market.17 Once the
embargo was lifted, numerous US firms made a concerted bid to enter Vietnam, in a
drive that was probably the last major ‘FDI push’ into the country, prior to the onset of
the Asian crisis.
Finally in this section, both Vietnam and Laos joined the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 and 1997, respectively. There is little doubt that the
primary reasons behind both countries joining were the perceived political and strategic
benefits to be derived from being a member, particularly regarding relations with
mighty China—with which both Laos and Vietnam have northern borders. (ASEAN's
well-established principle of mutual non-interference in the domestic circumstances of
fellow members will also have attracted Vientiane and Hanoi.18) However, the political
benefits of ASEAN membership also come with economic obligations, including
compliance with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Investment Area
(AIA), both of which will place additional demands on the two countries' economies.
For example, reducing import tariffs to comply with AFTA will reduce one important
layer of protection currently used to defend state enterprises from much leaner overseas
competition. Given a choice, both Vientiane and Hanoi would probably prefer an
ASEAN that does not include AFTA and AIA commitments, but that choice does not
exist, and the perceived political benefits of membership are deemed to outweigh the
less economic obligations of membership. (The extended deadlines given to Laos and
Vietnam for AFTA and AIA compliance—Laos must comply with AFTA by 2005 and
the AIA by 2010; Vietnam must comply with AFTA by 2003 and the AIA by 2010—
has given the two countries some breathing room.)
15 Lindblad (1998), p. 14. This compares with 10 per cent non-British investment in Burma, 29 per cent
non-Dutch investment in Indonesia, 30 per cent non-British investment in Malaysia, and 48 per cent
non-US investment in the Philippines, as at 1937.
16 For details of the US embargo, see Freeman (1993).
17 At the very least, the embargo resulted in a staggered inflow of foreign investment, with the first wave
led by European firms, a second wave led by Japan and East Asia, and a third wave of US firms. In
retrospect, this sequential inflow benefited Vietnam considerably, being easier to manage than a
massive single wave of FDI, and extended the euphoria associated with a market opening up for the
first time.
18 For a depiction of ASEAN's track record on non-interference, see Funston (2000), pp. 2-5.8
3 The impact of the ‘Asian crisis’, and growing anxiety over globalization
If the substantial increases of investment inflows to, and external trade with, Laos and
Vietnam were regarded by Vientiane and Hanoi as being broadly benign during the
early 1990s, this perception seemed to change around the mid-1990s, and particularly
after the onset of the regional economic downturn—the ‘Asian crisis’—in 1997. While
it would be incorrect to assert that leadership perceptions of the forces of globalization
were transformed from being completely benign to thoroughly malignant, it is true to
say that the potential perils of becoming integrated into the global economy were
brought to the fore, if only by those elements within the leaderships that had harboured
misgivings about the speed (and depth) of economic liberalisation measures all along. It
almost became accepted wisdom that, had it not been for delays in liberalising various
elements of the economy (such as foreign exchange and the finance sector), the impact
of the Asian crisis would have been much harder. Or put another way, if Laos and
Vietnam had been more integrated with the global economy, the adverse effects of the
regional downturn would have been much worse. This interpretation of events is
spurious, but nonetheless has gained currency in Vientiane and Hanoi, and partially
undermined the platform of pro-reform elements within the senior leaderships.
3.1 Laos
Despite having only the most rudimentary banking and financial system, the impact of
the Asian economic crisis on Laos was marked, and most evident in the fortunes of its
domestic currency, the kip. With an economy heavily oriented towards Thailand, both in
terms of trade and investment, it did not take long for the Thai currency crisis to migrate
across the Mekong River. Although officially illegal, the use of both the Thai baht and
US dollars for domestic transactions (and savings) in Laos is widespread. At first, the
Lao currency's value against the US dollar shadowed the decline of the Thai currency,
but after the baht began to stabilise, the value of the kip continued to weaken against
both the US dollar and the baht. This currency weakening persisted throughout 1998,
resulting in a devaluation even greater than for Indonesia's rupiah. This in itself was
quite peculiar, given that the fallout from the Asian economic crisis had an impact on
Indonesia's economic, social and political spheres that was far greater than anything
experienced in Laos. The sharp depreciation in the kip rapidly led to very high inflation,
as imported goods (on which Laos is heavily reliant) became considerably more
expensive in local currency terms. The spending power of urban Lao—including
government officials—declined precipitously, forcing the government to enact a number
of policies to mitigate the impact. These included reducing the hours of the working
week, in order that civil servants could generate additional income from second jobs.
While such measures may have helped a little, they did not wholly compensate for the
woes felt by most urbanites. Displeasure at what had happened almost certainly played a
part in the aborted demonstration that took place in Vientiane in October 1999, by
students and teachers.19
19 Demonstrations in Laos have been extremely rare. See Asiaweek (24 December 1999) and ‘Tiny
Splash Sets Wave in Motion’, The Nation, 24 March 2000.9
Having sourced the vast majority of its foreign investment from Thailand (72 per cent of
aggregate inflows between 1994 and 1999), the sharp economic downturn in Laos's
southern neighbour resulted in a sharp reduction in FDI inflows. The dire effect of the
financial crisis on Thailand's corporates caused a number of Laos's largest foreign
investors to revise back their plans for the country. To compound matters, a large
proportion of total foreign investment pledges (and licence approvals) in Laos had been
for an ambitious array of hydropower projects across the country. (Also see Table 2,
below.) Although far in excess of Laos's own power needs, the electricity generated was
to have been exported to Thailand. However, Thailand's power demand projections have
subsequently been sharply revised down, and a substantial proportion of the approved
hydropower projects will not now proceed. And for those that do proceed, Vientiane
and Bangkok have been stuck in negotiations over the terms of the power purchasing
deals. Laos's policy-makers had placed much emphasis on these power projects as a
pillar of the country's economic development drive, which—with the benefit of
hindsight—meant that they had placed ‘too many eggs’ in the hydropower ‘basket’.
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“When imperialism speeds up trade and services liberalisation and
globalization of investment, the rich countries become richer, and the gap
between rich and poor countries widens.”20 [Emphasis added.]
The above quotation is taken from a speech by the General Secretary of the Vietnam
Communist Party, Le Kha Phieu, given in early 2000. These words provide a telling
20 Le Kha Phieu, speaking at the 70th anniversary celebrations of the VCP, January 2000. Vietnam
Business Journal, February 2000. http://www.viam.com/02-2000/editorsnote.htm.10
indication of the senior leadership's concerns about the forces of globalization, and the
threat posed by “hostile forces” seeking to “wipe out the remaining socialist
countries”.21 While this concern was not wholly in abeyance prior to the Asian crisis, it
was much less apparent. Perhaps the most tangible evidence of these concerns was the
debacle that occurred at the APEC summit in Auckland, in September 1999, when
Hanoi made an eleventh hour decision not to sign a ‘normal trading rights’ agreement
with the US, having initialed a preliminary agreement a few months before (after nine
rounds of negotiations).22 Such an agreement would have been the most significant
development in Vietnam's process of rejoining the international business community
since the lifting of the US embargo in 1995, and been the penultimate stop in a process
that had begun in 1987, with the promulgation of its foreign investment law. Hanoi's
decision not to sign in Auckland came as a body-blow to already sombre sentiment
towards Vietnam by most foreign investors, and took overseas business perceptions of
the country to new lows, from which it will be hard to recover. On a more immediate
note, the signing of a US-China trade agreement, just two months later, means that the
latter will now have a distinct advantage over Vietnam in terms of its exports entering
the US market. As a direct competitor to Vietnam in various exports, China now has the
upper hand.
Unlike Laos, Vietnam did not witness a dramatic depreciation in its domestic currency
(the ‘dong’), during and immediately after the financial crisis in Thailand. Hanoi's
currency strategy has resembled that of China; to maintain the fixed exchange rate,
regardless of the impact this may have on export competitiveness, resulting from the
currency depreciations by other countries in East Asia. (Although Vietnam's policy-
makers may insist that the dong exchange rate has the ability to freely move within a
permitted trading band, the incremental movements are so minute as to be
inconsequential.)
Probably the greatest impact of the Asian crisis on Vietnam was felt in the foreign
investment inflow figures, which have almost evaporated over the last 2-3 years.23
Although pledges of new FDI had probably peaked in 1996, both the pledges and
disbursements of foreign investment began to trend down sharply after mid-1997.
Unlike Laos, Vietnam's FDI inflows were not dominated by one country source and one
sector: the industry sector (both light and heavy) comprises roughly a third of all
approved foreign investment, followed by hotels and tourism, construction,
telecommunications, and oil and gas exploration. (See Table 2, below.) Nonetheless,
approximately 70 per cent of Vietnam's FDI inflows were being sourced from the Asia
Pacific region, including those countries most affected by the financial crisis and
subsequent regional economic downturn. Therefore, one would be right to attribute at
21 Vietnam Business Journal, February 2000 (editor's note). http://www.viam.com/02-
2000/editorsnote.htm.
22 Hanoi's last minute change of mind came as a complete surprise. Negotiations on a trade deal had
been underway for several years. The US offer of lower import tariffs came with concomitant
conditions on opening up the Vietnamese economy to foreign firms, and it was perhaps these
conditions which prevented Hanoi from signing.
23 Recent years have seen the official FDI inflow figures inflated by a few ‘big ticket’ investment
projects, some of which are unlikely to reach fruition, but help in keeping the official figures for
foreign investment at artificially high levels.11
least part of the FDI inflow decline to the impact of the Asian crisis. However, the
regional economic downturn was not the only cause of the contraction in foreign
investment, as indicated by the fact that FDI inflows peaked in 1996, ahead of the Asian
crisis. Much of the initial euphoria towards Vietnam as a new investment destination
began to wear off in 1996 (see Figure 2 below), and it after the Eighth Party Congress of
mid-1996 the economic reform process began to lose momentum, and it has yet to
convincingly recover. As a result, foreign investors began to revise down their
expectations for the country, as new economic liberalisation measures were not
forthcoming, and foreign firms began to hold back on enacting new projects.
Figure 2





















Perhaps one area of Vietnam's economic policy-making that best displays the
leadership's general anxiety over globalization, and a reluctance to enact business
liberalisation measures that go beyond what is deemed acceptable by the more
conservative elements, has been in the field of capital markets. Since roughly 1991,
Hanoi has been toying with opening a stock market. Yet despite establishing a securities
regulatory commission in 1997, and issuing various pieces of regulatory paperwork,
Vietnam has still to unveil a stock market.24 While the reasons behind this delay are
complex, and include genuine logistical problems, the fact that Hanoi has been so slow
in overcoming various hurdles reflects in part a lack of leadership consensus on the
issue. (And witnessing what happened to the stock markets of most East Asian countries
during the Asian crisis has probably served to weaken leadership consensus even
further.25) A Chinese dissident remarked in 1997 that his country's stock market “has
that magic power that makes people concerned about the country's economic policy …
24 The State Securities Commission replaced a Capital Markets Development department, located within
the State Bank of Vietnam.
25 The fact that the financial crises in East Asia were largely the result of excessive commercial bank
lending, and that the damage inflicted on stock market valuations was a symptom (not a cause) of the
crisis, is probably lost on many in the Vietnamese leadership.12
once the will of the people is awakened, they will not sleep again”.26 But a stock market
also has the potential to act as a conduit for foreign portfolio investment into domestic
enterprises listed on the market, which may also pose concerns for some in Vietnam's
leadership, despite the fact that a shortage of capital (both credit and equity) has been
the single largest problem facing the country's corporate sector for the last few years.
Until 1998, the slow pace of stock market development in Vietnam was mirrored by a
similarly glacial approach to the divestment of non-essential state enterprises, with a
host of practical hurdles cited as the reason for sloth. However, the pace of state sector
divestment—known as ‘equitisation’ in Vietnam—increased considerably in 1999,
indicating that when sufficient political will is galvanised, economic liberalisation
measures can move forward quite rapidly.27 Recent progress on ‘equitisation’ was one
of the very few bright spots on the economic liberalisation ‘front’ for Vietnam in
1998-99.28
Table 2:
Major FDI Patterns in Laos and Vietnam
Top Five Foreign Investors in Laos Top Five Foreign Investors in Vietnam
% of total % of total
Thailand 46.90% Singapore 15.7%
USA 26.60% Taiwan 13.0%
Korea 5.70% Japan 9.5%
Australia 5.10% Hong Kong 9.2%
Malaysia 4.90% Korea 8.4%
Top Five Foreign Investment Sectors in Laos Top Five Foreign Investment Sectors in Vietnam
% of total % of total
Energy 66.1% Construction 18.4%
Hotels/tourism 8.9% Heavy industry 16.5%
Telecomms. 8.2% Hotels/tourism 13.5%
Manufacturing 7.0% Light industry 10.8%
Wood products 2.4% Telecomms. 8.6%
Sources: OECF (1999) and Vietnam Business Journal (various issues).
26 Quote by Wu'er Kaixi, cited in Chancellor (1999), p. 330.
27 Between 1992 and 1997, just 18 state enterprises were equitised. But in 1998 alone, 116 state firms
were equitised, followed by another 260 in 1999. Nguyen (2000), pp. 23-26.
28 Not normally known for taking the lead on policy initiatives, Laos has a more impressive track record
than Vietnam in the state sector divestment field, having been more willing to sell or lease state firms
to private investors (both local and foreign).13
4 The way forward for economic reform: coming to terms with globalization
The extreme opacity of the decision-making process in Vientiane and Hanoi make it
difficult for external observers to judge how the leaderships of Laos and Vietnam are
debating issues relating to globalization. It is therefore hard to forecast whether they
will come to terms with globalization, and whether they will choose to re-invigorate the
economic reform process. While there is probably little prospect of Laos and Vietnam
actually reversing the economic liberalisation measures enacted since the late 1980s, it
is conceivable that the recent ‘non-policy’ stance will persist in the coming years, until
some sort of consensus within the senior leadership is arrived at, or events overtake the
leadership. If so, we can expect to see the continuation of broadly pro-liberalisation
utterances, with incremental improvements made to the legislative and regulatory
regimes that pertain to the business environment. In other words, a continuation of the
modus operandi that has been in place since roughly 1996.
A more positive and convincing economic liberalisation drive in the short term would
probably be only forthcoming if the distress to the economies of Laos and Vietnam was
of a level that prompted remedial action by the leadership, rather in the same way that
the first tranche of economic reforms of 1986 was in response to dire economic plight.
But such a situation in itself would not be a sufficient pre-condition, as it would also
require a consensus within Vientiane and Hanoi that further economic liberalisation
measures provided the best chance of economic improvement, and that the potential
rewards outweighed the perceived risks. And even then, it would remain to be seen
whether the economic liberalisation measures taken—regardless of their boldness—
were the right ones for the job. At a time of increasing globalization, this not only
requires competency, but also a degree of vision and imagination, in a field where the
leaderships of Laos and Vietnam are relatively inexperienced.
One particular area of concern for this observer is that the sorts of ‘micro’ economic
liberalisation measures now being enacted in Laos and Vietnam—fine-tuning a business
law here, adjusting an implementing regulation there—in a bid to regain economic
momentum is of little utility, and indeed may even be counter-productive. The
economic growth spurt of the late 1980s and early 1990s was attributable in large part to
the activity of the private sector (both domestic and foreign firms alike), after having
been restricted or wholly excluded in previous decades. Changes in the various laws,
decrees and regulations opened up an avenue of economic endeavour that was seized by
everyone, from local farming families to major foreign multinationals. And the sorts of
laws and decrees that were drafted broadly complied with an established ‘blueprint’ for
economic development that had been tried and tested by other Southeast Asian countries
in the 1970s and 1980s. In the specific case of foreign investment, particular emphasis
was placed on encouraging export-oriented production projects (everything from
electricity generation in Laos for sale to Thailand, to garment manufacturing in Vietnam
for sale to Europe), as exemplified by the export processing zones and industrial zones
that sprouted up across Vietnam.
Foreign investors had an appetite for this sort of approach in the 1980s, and although
this had begun to wane, they still had some lingering interest in establishing new plant
in Laos and Vietnam during the 1990s. However, forces of globalization—particularly
with regard to new efficiencies of production and the economies of scale to be derived
from cross-border production networks—are helping to ensure that such appetite is now
much-diminished. At a time of global over-capacity in many of the fields where Laos14
and Vietnam were seeking to develop capabilities, appetite for new power plants and car
assembly plants has been almost wholly satiated. Yet, the micro liberalisation measures
being enacted by Vientiane and Hanoi are very much still within the mindset of the ‘old
economy blueprint’. While appropriate for that stage of transition in Laos and Vietnam,
and appropriate for the business environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s, such
policies may have less relevance in the next stage of transition, and in the new
international business environment. In short, diminishing returns are beginning to set in
for the reform agenda pursued by Laos and Vietnam since the late 1980s.
At worst, tinkering with existing laws and regulations—accompanied by poor
performance in implementation—succeeds in only further complicating what has
become a remarkably labyrinthine regulatory regime, for Vietnam in particular, thereby
adding to the opacity of these host country business environments.29 At best, the
benefits to be derived from ‘micro’ tinkering are wholly discounted by on-going macro
hurdles that confront both foreign and domestic business: non-convertibility of the
currency; regulations that oblige firms to exchange any foreign exchange earnings into
local currency; hassles incurred when dealing with a petulant customs service; scant
recourse to law in areas such as intellectual property rights, etc. One observer recently
commented that foreign “investors will return [to Vietnam] only when the government
demonstrates the necessary seriousness of purpose to convince prudent executives to put
their money at risk”.30 The policy-makers in Laos and Vietnam know this, but are
wrong to think that repeated re-drafting of a few laws will be sufficient to display a
seriousness of purpose. Above and beyond improving the legislative framework, the
gestures have to be more convincing, more imaginative, and more oriented towards a
rapidly changing international business environment. And they must not be discounted
by references to ‘imperialism’ by the Secretary General of the Communist Party—the
single most powerful man in Vietnam. A lot of foreign investors jumped into Laos and
Vietnam with both feet during the early 1990s and promptly ‘lost their shirts’; the next
tranche are likely to be more cautious.
Laos and Vietnam's policy-makers do not seem to have developed a grasp of the sorts
economic liberalisation measures that are necessary for a developing country in the
global economy of today, as opposed to the global economy of a few decades ago. With
most developing countries now offering liberal investment regimes and incentive
packages as standard, the competition to attract foreign firms has moved on, to more
macro-economic issues like: the quality—transparency and robustness—of the domestic
financial sector (particularly post-crisis), the standard of infrastructure, the cost of
communications, the level of human capital, and so on. In these sorts of areas, Laos and
Vietnam do not score highly. While some in Vientiane and Hanoi might be sorely
tempted to dispense with foreign investment as part of their economic development
process, such a notion would be self-deluding. Both countries need foreign capital, and
arguably more importantly, they need foreign export markets, technology, and know-
how. While Laos might be able to consider relying on external assistance (eg. bilateral
aid and multilateral agency grants) alone, this sort of assistance also comes with strings
attached, often in areas that are socio-politically contentious. Multilateral agencies are
29 Excessive opacity of a host country's business regime can provide a fertile breading ground for corrupt
practices. See Beattie (2000).
30 Rushford (2000).15
increasingly attaching conditionalities to assistance that relate to issues of economic and
political governance, yet private investors rarely have conditionalities that go no further
than corporate governance. Hanoi and Vientiane profess that they remain keen to attract
foreign firms, but the ‘micro’ policy prescriptions being used are not of the sort that will
galvanise overseas investors nor excite the creative juices of entrepreneurs.
5 Conclusion
Laos and Vietnam enacted economic liberalisation measures in a bid to transform their
economies into versions of the more vibrant economic models that surrounded them in
Southeast Asia. Half way through doing so, Laos and Vietnam's leaders saw the Asian
crisis partially discredit the economic models that they were seeking to emulate. And to
make matters worse, forces of globalization now seem to point to a much more
demanding liberalisation agenda than was initially envisaged, with implications that
may include various additional socio-political perils. Possibly having psyched
themselves up for a relatively brief dash to reach the ‘transition line’, the leaderships in
Vientiane and Hanoi have discovered that globalization is more like a long-distance
endurance race. Whether Laos and Vietnam have the necessary stamina and volition to
stay in the race remains to be seen.
References
Beattie, Alan (2000). ‘Investors Wary of Developing Economies’, Financial Times,4
April 2000 (www.FT.com.)
Callis, Helmut G. (1942). Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia. New York: Institute of
Pacific Relations. (Re-printed in 1976 by Arno Press, New York.)
Chancellor, Edward (1999). Devil Take the Hindmost. London: Macmillan.
Evans, Grant (1998). The Politics of Ritual and Remembrance: Laos Since 1975.
Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
Freeman, Nick J. (1993). ‘United States's Economic Sanctions Against Vietnam’.
Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XXVIII, No. II (Summer 1993), pp. 12-
22.
Funston, John (2000). ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Intervention—Practice and
Prospects. (Trends in Southeast Asia Paper No. 5.) Singapore: ISEAS, March.
IMF (1999). Vietnam: Selected Issues (IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/55.)
Washington: IMF, July.
IMF (1999). Vietnam: Statistical Appendix (IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/56.)
Washington: IMF, July.
IMF (2000). Lao People's Democratic Republic: Recent Economic Developments (IMF
Staff Country Report No. 3.) Washington: IMF, January.16
Lindblad, J. Thomas (1998). Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia in the Twentieth
Century. London: Macmillan.
Nguyen Huy Hoang (2000). The Private Sector and the Process of Privatization in
Vietnam. Draft paper.
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. The Lao Economy: Its Current Status and
Future Challenges. Tokyo, OECF Research Papers No. 30, February 1999.
Olds, Kris, Peter Dicken, Philip Kelly, Lily Kong and Henry Wai-chung Yeung (eds)
(1999). Globalization and the Asia-Pacific. London: Routledge.
Rischard, Jean-Francois (2000). ‘The New World Economy and Global Governance’.
Paper presented at the Regional Outlook 2000-2001 Conference, Singapore, January
2000.
Rushford, Greg (2000). ‘Vietnam at a Crossroads’, Asian Wall Street Journal,1 0A p r i l
2000.
Smith, Ralph (1968). Viet-Nam and the West. London: Heinemann.
Stuart-Fox, Martin (1997). A History of Laos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
UNCTAD (1999). World Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the
Challenge of Development. New York: United Nations.
UNDP (1998). Human Development Report 1998. New York: United Nations.UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
was established by the United Nations University as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The purpose of
the Institute is to undertake applied research and policy analysis on structural
changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, to provide a
forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and
environmentally sustainable growth, and to promote capacity strengthening
and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Its work is
carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through
networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Anna Kervinen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 952-455-204-3 (printed publication)
ISBN 952-455-205-1 (internet publication)